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Abstract  
“Review of the operations over the digital certificates in various cases” 
 
This thesis will study the problems o f cer tificates the ir vu lnerab ilit y,  and a lternat ive  
so lutions.   The proposed research plan includes experiments on studying the securit y 
and performance  aspects of each of the a l ternative so lutions.   Appendix conta ins the 
programming part.  
In Chapter 1 is described some theoretic al aspects and b rie f overview about HTTP, 
HTTPS, their  difference,  digital cert ificates,  and etc. Chapter 2 summarizes the sta te  
HTTP and HTTPS connect ion,  SSL properties,  Server Authent icat ion.  In third 
chapter is described the operation over the digital certif ica tes as untangling d igital 
cert if icates,  ob taining of cert if icates,  ins talling the cert if icates,   the graphics,  and 
the designing and implementat ion o f the program with easy structu re which allow to 
do operations over the cert ificates in Windows operation system. The purpose of this  
thesis is to show the operation over the digita l cert if icat ion connect ing the problems 
related to  the changing o f the wrong certif icates and designing and  implementation 
of the p rogram. 
 The following are the three most common securit y r isks CGI applicat ions and SSI 
pages create: Info rmat ion leaks, dep let ing system resources,  access to potentia ll y 
dangerous system commands/applicat ions.The intent was to  create a model that  
improved the wa y revocat ion is handled in terms o f:  Revocat ion t ime, Security,  
Sca labilit y.  The proposed  solu tion is based on the X.509 framework. The reason wh y 
I choose this framework was: It  u ses a centralized certif icate authority and it  has  a  
very well defined  structu re.   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referat 
“Rəqəmsal sertifikatlar üzərində müxtəlif  hallarda əməliyyatların 
təhlil i” 
 
Dip lom işində sert if ikat ların zəif tərəflə ri və alternat iv həllər təhlil  olunur.  Təklif  
olunan tədqiqat planı eksper iment və yer inə yet ir ilən aspekt ləri özündə cəmləşd irir .  
Birinc i fəs ildə ümumi nəzər i aspekt lər ,  Http  və Https haqqında və onların fərqi 
haqqında,  sert ifikat lar  haqqında qısa məlumat verilib.  Ikinci fəsildə isə  Http və  
Https əlaqəsi,  SSL  xüsusiyyə tləri,  serverdə ausent if ikasiyası təsvir  o lunur.  Üçüncü 
fəs ildə sert ifikat lar  üzərində  müxtə lif  hallarda əməliyya tar ın təhlili,  Windows 
əməliyyat sis temində sert ifikat lar  üzərində əməliyya tlar ın asan strukturalı proqramın 
yerinə yet irməsini,  ,  hans ı ki Windows əməliyyat ı sistemində sertif ikat lar  üzərində  
əməliyyat lar  keçirməyə üçün imkan ver ir .   
Aşağıda göstər ilən üç ümumi təhlükəsiz lik  r isklər i  CGI tətbiqlər i və SSL yarad ır: 
İnformasiya  s ızmaları:  Hakerə istəni lən s istem info rmasiyas ı serverinizdən 
gönürməyə imkan ver ir.  S istem resurslar ının tükənməsi.  
Məqsəd ele bir  model yaratmaq  idi ki,   ləğv etmə vaxt ını,  təhlükəsizliyi,  əhatəliliyi   
təkmilləşdir ir .  
Təklif edilmiş hə ll X.509 struktu ra əsaslanır .  Səbəbi isə onun mərkəzləşdirmiş  
sert if ikat lar  avto rizasiyası ist ifadə ed ir və o  çox yaxşı struktu ra malikdir .  
.Əlavədə isə təklif olunan proqramın proqramlaşdirma hissəsi daxild ir .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1.  
Introduction 
1.2 Hypertext Transfer Protocol  
 
In this chapter is described some theoretical aspects. 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a communications protocol used to transfer or convey 
information on the World Wide Web. Its original purpose was to provide a way to publish and retrieve 
HTML hypertext pages. HTTP is a request/response protocol between clients and servers. The 
originating client, such as a web browser, spider, or other end-user tool, is referred to as the user agent. 
The destination server, which stores or creates resources such as HTML files and images, is called the 
origin server. In between the user agent and origin server may be several intermediaries, such as 
proxies, gateways, and tunnels. It is useful to remember that HTTP does not need TCP/IP. Indeed 
HTTP can be "implemented on top of any other protocol on the Internet, or on other networks. HTTP 
only presumes a reliable transport; any protocol that provides such guarantees can be used." 
There are currently two methods of establishing a secure HTTP connection: the https URI scheme and 
the HTTP 1.1 Upgrade header. The https URI scheme has been deprecated by RFC 2817, which 
introduced the Upgrade header; however, as browser support for the Upgrade header is nearly non-
existent, the https URI scheme is still the dominant method of establishing a secure HTTP connection. 
https URI Scheme 
https: is a URI scheme syntactically identical to the http: scheme used for normal HTTP connections, 
but which signals the browser to use an added encryption layer of SSL/TLS to protect the traffic. SSL 
is especially suited for HTTP since it can provide some protection even if only one side of the 
communication is authenticated. In the case of HTTP transactions over the Internet, typically only the 
server side is authenticated 
HTTP 1.1 Upgrade header 
HTTP 1.1 introduced support for the Upgrade header. In the exchange, the client begins by making a 
clear-text request, which is later upgraded to TLS. Either the client or the server may request (or 
demand) that the connection be upgraded. The most common usage is a clear-text request by the client 
followed by a server demand to upgrade the connection, which looks like this: 
Client: 
GET /encrypted-area HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.example.com 
Server: 
HTTP/1.1 426 Upgrade Required 
Upgrade: TLS/1.0, HTTP/1.1 
Connection: Upgrade 
The server returns a 426 status-code because 400 level codes indicate a client failure (see List of HTTP 
status codes), which correctly alerts legacy clients that the failure was client-related. 
The benefits of using this method for establishing a secure connection are: 
Sample 
Below is a sample conversation between an HTTP client and an HTTP server running on 
www.example.com, port 80. 
Client request (followed by a blank line, so that request ends with a double newline, each in the form 
of a carriage return followed by a line feed): 
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.example.com 
The "Host" header distinguishes between various DNS names sharing a single IP address, allowing 
name-based virtual hosting. While optional in HTTP/1.0, it is mandatory in HTTP/1.1. 
Server response (followed by a blank line and text of the requested page): 
HTTP 200 OK 
Date: Mon, 15 May 2009 22:38:34 GMT 
Server: Apache/1.3.27 (Unix)  (Red-Hat/Linux) 
Last-Modified: Wed, 08 Jan 2003 23:11:55 GMT 
Etag: "3f80f-1b6-3e1cb03b" 
Accept-Ranges: bytes 
Content-Length: 438 
Connection: close 
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 
 
Reading and writing data using HTTP 
 
1. Obtain the HttpConnection Object—Before data can be read or written from and to the server, a 
HttpConnection object is needed. Connector class of javax.microedition.io package provides three 
ways to obtain the HttpConnection Object— 
• HttpConnection httpConn = (HttpConnection)Connector.open(String url); 
• HttpConnection httpConn = (HttpConnection)Connector.open(String url, int mode); 
• HttpConnection httpConn = (HttpConnection)Connector.open(String url, int mode, boolean 
timeout); 
In the above methods— 
• url—is the url of the server. For HttpConnection it will be of the format— 
http://www.site.com. 
• mode—specifies one of the READ, READ_WRITE or WRITE modes. If no mode is 
specified, the default mode is READ_WRITE, i.e. both read and write operations can be 
performed . 
• timeout—a flag to indicate if the caller wants to see the exceptions on time out. If this flag is true and 
if connection cannot be made after 60 seconds, the open() will throw IOException. If no flag is 
specified, the default value is true. 
 
2. Reading from the server—The HttpConnection object so obtained can be used to read data from 
the server by obtaining the input stream or data input stream. The input stream can be obtained 
by using the openInputStream() of the obtained HttpConnection object, whereas the data input 
stream can be obtained by using the openDataInputStream() of HttpConnection object as shown 
below— 
• InputStream is = httpConn.openInputStream(); 
• DataInputStream dis = htppConn.openDataInputStream(); 
Data can be read using the read method of the InputStream and DataInputStream class. It should be 
noted that if no data can be read from the server within 40 seconds, the read method will 
throw IOException. 
 
3. Writing to server— In order to write or post some data to a server, an output stream or data output 
stream is required. The request method—POST should be specified by using setRequestMethod() of 
HttpConnection, before writing data to server. It is also recommended to send the Content-Length 
header in the request with the exact length of data to be read. After setting the headers, the output 
stream can be obtained by using the openOutputStream method of the  ttpConnection, whereas the data 
output stream can be obtained by using the openDataOutputStream() of HttpConnection as shown 
below— 
• OutputStream os = httpConn.openOutputStream(); 
• DataOutputStream dos = httpConn.openDataOutputStream(); 
Data can then be written using the write method of the OutputStream or DataOutputStream. It should 
be noted that if no data can be written to the server within 60 seconds, the read method will throw  
OException. 
 
1.3 Https 
 
https is a URI scheme used to indicate a secure HTTP connection. It is syntactically identical to the 
http:// scheme normally used for accessing resources using HTTP. Using an https: URL indicates that 
HTTP is to be used, but with a different default TCP port (443) and an additional 
encryption/authentication layer between the HTTP and TCP. This system was designed by Netscape 
Communications Corporation to provide authentication and encrypted communication and is widely 
used on the World Wide Web for security-sensitive communication such as payment transactions and 
corporate logons. 
Https is not a separate protocol, but refers to the combination of a normal HTTP interaction over an 
encrypted Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) transport mechanism. This 
ensures reasonable protection from eavesdroppers and man-in-the-middle attacks, provided it is 
properly implemented and the top level certification authorities do their job. 
The default TCP port of an https: URL is 443 (for unsecured HTTP, the default is 80). 
To prepare a web-server for accepting https connections the administrator must create a public key 
certificate for the web-server. These certificates can be created for Unix based servers with tools such 
as OpenSSL's ssl-ca  or SuSE's gensslcert. This certificate must be signed by a certificate authority of 
one form or another, who certifies that the certificate holder is who they say they are. Web browsers 
are generally distributed with the signing certificates of major certificate authorities, so that they can 
verify certificates signed by them. 
Organizations may also run their own certificate authority, particularly if they are responsible for 
setting up browsers to access their own sites (for example, sites on a company intranet), as they can 
trivially add their own signing certificate to the defaults shipped with the browser. 
Some sites use self signed certificates. Using these provides protection against pure eavesdropping but 
unless the certificate is verified by some other method (for example, phoning the certificate owner to 
verify its checksum) and that other method is secure, there is a risk of a man-in-the-middle attack. 
The system can also be used for client authentication, in order to restrict access to a Web server to only 
authorized users. For this, typically the site administrator creates certificates for each user which are 
loaded into their browser, although certificates signed by any certificate authority the server trusts 
should work. These normally contain the name and e-mail of the authorized user, and are 
automatically checked by the server on each reconnect to verify the user's identity, potentially without 
ever entering a password. 
HTTPS configuration  
The httpsConfig protocol configuration parameter is used for requests using the https protocol to 
specify the certificate and trust for the outbound HTTPS connection. 
The value of httpsConfig names an outbound HTTPS configuration that has been defined as 
/config/connection/https/ configName. If no httpsConfig value was associated with the request using 
the mechanisms described in Configuring protocols the supplied configuration, defaultConfig, will be 
used. 
The behavior of the defaultConfig configuration depends on whether the application includes the 
zero.core.webtools dependency: 
 If zero.core.webtools is included, a development and test configuration is assumed:  
 Outbound HTTPS connections using defaultConfig will not perform any checks to validate the 
identity of the remote server.  
 If zero.core.webtools is not included, a simple trust configuration is assumed:  
 Outbound HTTPS connections using defaultConfig will check that the remote sever presents a 
valid certificate signed by one of a selection of well-known certificate authorities.  
The HTTPS connection configurations defined under /config/connection/https/ configName can 
contain the following properties: 
 
Property Description Notes 
trustStore 
File name of trust store to be used to validate server 
identity. Required. 
trustStorePassword Trust store password. (XOR strings are supported) Required. 
trustStoreType Trust store type. Required. 
keyStore File name of key store containing client certificate. 
Optional, default is no 
client certificate. 
keyStorePassword Key store password. (XOR strings are supported) 
Required if keyStore is 
specified. 
keyStoreType Key store type. 
Required if keyStore is 
specified. 
disableTrustVerification 
If true, the outbound connection will not perform 
any checks to validate the identity of the remote 
server. 
Optional, default value 
is false 
Limitations 
The level of protection depends on the correctness of the implementation by the web browser and the 
server software and the actual cryptographic algorithms supported. 
A common misconception among credit card users on the Web is that https: fully protects their card 
number from thieves. In reality, an encrypted connection to the Web server only protects the credit 
card number in transit between the user's computer and the server itself. It doesn't guarantee that the 
server itself is secure, or even that it hasn't already been compromised by an attacker. 
Attacks on the Web sites that store customer data are both easier and more common than attempts to 
intercept data in transit. Merchant sites are supposed to immediately forward incoming transactions to 
a payment gateway and retain only a transaction number, but they often save card numbers in a 
database. It is that server and database that is usually attacked and compromised by unauthorized 
users. 
Because SSL operates below http and has no knowledge of the higher level protocol, SSL servers can 
only present one certificate for a particular IP/port combination. This means that in most cases it is not 
feasible to use name-based virtual hosting with HTTPS.  
Reading and writing data using HttpsConnection 
 
1. Reading and writing data using HttpsConnection is very similar to reading data over the 
HttpConnection (as discussed previously in steps 1 to 3), except for the way the HttpsConnection 
object is obtained. The HttpsConnection object can be obtained by replacing the HttpConnection 
in step 1 of previous section with the HttpsConnection. So the HttpsConnection object can be obtained 
from one of the following open methods of Connector class— 
 
• HttpsConnection httpsConn = (HttpsConnection)Connector.open(String url); 
• HttpsConnection httpsConn = (HttpsConnection)Connector.open(String url, int mode); 
• HttpsConnection httpsConn = (HttpsConnection)Connector.open(String url, int mode, 
boolean timeout); 
 
It should be noted that the url for the HttpsConnection will be of the format https://www.site.com. The 
HttpsConnection obtained in step 1, can be used to read and write in the same way as the 
HttpConnection was in previous section. It should be noted that the same time out values mentioned in 
previous section for HttpConnection object (in step 1), read() (in step2) and write() (in step 3), will 
hold for HttpsConnection object, read() 
 
There are now following services 
- Web Application Review 
- External Black Box Penetration Testing 
- White Box Security Assessment 
- Security Architecture Review 
- Security Remediation Consulting 
 
The very first question a Web server administrator must confront is, "Do I really want/need to provide 
dynamic content from my server?" While dynamic content has allowed for a diverse range of user 
interaction and become a de facto standard for most large Web sites, it remains one of the largest 
security threats on the Internet. CGI applications and SSI-enabled pages are not inherently insecure, 
but poorly written code can potentially open up dangerous back doors and gaping holes on what would 
otherwise be a well-secured system. 
The following are the three most common security risks CGI applications and SSI pages create: 
 Information leaks: Providing any kind of system information to a hacker could potentially 
provide a hacker with the ammunition they need to break into your server. The less a hacker 
knows about the configuration of a system, the harder it is to break into.  
 Access to potentially dangerous system commands/applications: One of the most common 
exploits used by hackers is to "take over" a service running on the server and use it for their 
own purposes. For example, gaining access to a mail application via an HTML form-based 
script, and then harnessing the mail server to send out spam or acquire confidential user 
information.  
 Depleting system resources: While not a direct security threat per se, a poorly written CGI 
application can use up a system's available resources to the point where it becomes almost 
completely unresponsive. 
1.3 HTTP and HTTPS difference  
The HyperText Transfer Protocol is an application layer protocol, which means it focuses on how 
information is presented to the user of the computer but doesn’t care a whit about how data gets from 
Point A to Point B. It is stateless, which means it doesn’t attempt to remember anything about the 
previous Web session. This is great because there is less data to send, and that means speed. And 
HTTP operates on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Port 80 by default, meaning your computer 
must send and receive data through this port to use HTTP. Not just any old port will do. 
Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTPS) is for all practical purposes HTTP. The chief distinction 
is that it uses TCP Port 443 by default, so HTTP and HTTPS are two separate communications. 
HTTPS works in conjunction with another protocol, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), to transport data 
safely. Remember, HTTP and HTTPS don’t care how the data gets to its destination. In contrast, SSL 
doesn’t care what the data looks like. People often use the terms HTTPS and SSL interchangeably, but 
this isn’t accurate. HTTPS is secure because it uses SSL to move data. 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (http) is a system for transmitting and receiving information across the 
Internet. Http serves as a request and response procedure that all agents on the Internet follow so that 
information can be rapidly, easily, and accurately disseminated between servers, which hold 
information, and clients, who are trying to access it. Http is commonly used to access html pages, but 
other resources can be utilized as well through http. While exchanging confidential information with a 
server, which needs to be secured in order to prevent unauthorized access a client needs some sort of 
security which is provided by https, or secure http which allows authorization and secured transactions. 
If you visit a website or webpage, and look at the address in the web browser, it will most likely begin 
with the following: http://. This means that the website is connected to your browser using the regular 
unsecure language, due to which there is a possiblilty for someone to spy on your computer’s 
conversation with the website. If you fill out a form on the website, someone might see the information 
you send to that site. 
But if the web address begins with https://, that basically means your computer is talking to the website 
in a secure code that no one can spy on the information you fill in. 
https is quite similar to http, because it follows the same basic protocols. The http or https client, such 
as a Web browser, establishes a connection to a server on a standard port. When a server receives a 
request, it returns a status and a message, which may contain the requested information or indicate an 
error if part of the process malfunctioned. Both systems use the same Uniform Resource Identifier 
(URI) scheme, so that resources can be universally identified. Use of https in a URI scheme rather than 
http indicates that an encrypted connection is desired. 
When using an https connection, the server responds to the initial connection by offering a list of 
encryption methods it supports. In response, the client selects a connection method, and the client and 
server exchange certificates to authenticate their identities. After this is done, both parties exchange the 
encrypted information after ensuring that both are using the same key, and the connection is closed. In 
order to host https connections, a server must have a public key certificate, which embeds key 
information with a verification of the key owner’s identity. Most certificates are verified by a third 
party so that clients are assured that the key is secure. 
Https is used in many situations, such as log-in pages for banking, forms, corporate log ons, and other 
applications in which data needs to be secure. However, if not implemented properly, https is not 
infallible, and therefore it is extremely important for end users to be wary about accepting questionable 
certificates and cautious with their personal information while using the Internet. 
The importance of electronic commerce is widely acknowledged. Surveys of Web users indicate that 
poor performance is a major cause of dissatisfaction. This paper presents results that show that popular 
servers that use the Secure HyperText Transport Protocol (HTTPS), the secure version of the 
HyperText Transport Protocol (HTTP), can transmit typical documents with little performance 
penalty.  
Encrypted Communications 
We briefly review the operation of secure Web communications. The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 
protocol has become most widely used method for encrypting and authenticating Web 
communications. Conducting SSL communications involves the following steps:  
 A client establishes a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection with a server, which 
involves one round-trip message delay when no failure occurs.  
 On top of TCP, the client and server establish a secure SSL communication channel. The 
application implements this by issuing an SSL_connect() call to the SSL library. The client and server 
negotiate a mutually agreeable cipher, which is a stream encryption algorithm and an authentication 
method pair. The client and server use a public key cryptographic protocol to exchange secret session 
keys that will be used to encrypt and decrypt application layer messages. Secret keys are frequently 
used for streaming encryption because public key encryption is much more expensive.  
 On top of SSL, the client and server exchange one or more HTTP messages. A single HTTP 
message is exchanged in HTTP/1.0; multiple messages would be exchanged in keep-alive or persistent 
connections. To use encryption the application code issues calls to SSL_write() and SSL_read(), 
instead of calls to TCP socket write() and read(), respectively.  
The performance of the encryption algorithm RC4 [RC4] was studied. RC4 is a variable key-size 
stream cipher designed by Ron Rivest. Designed for byte-oriented operations, RC4 is expected to run 
quickly, as it uses only 8 to 16 instructions per byte.  
A non-statistical survey of 5384 secure Web sites worldwide in March 1997 found that 59% of the 
secure servers were Netscape or Microsoft and used RC4 encryption. The portion for each server and 
key size is shown in Table 1.  
 40 bit 128 
bit 
Total 
Netscape-Enterprise 
(includes multiple 
versions) 
16.4% 10.4% 26.8% 
Microsoft-IIS (includes 
multiple versions) 
20.0% 12.6% 32.6% 
Total 36.4% 23.0% 59.4% 
Table 1.1. The Subset of the Secure Servers Which Run Netscape or Microsoft and Use RC4  
Secret key sizes of 40 and 128 bits constitute the vast majority of production RC4 keys. The smaller, 
40-bit key is called "export strength" because the US Government permits its export from the United 
States. It is breakable with moderate effort. The 128-bit key is considered long enough to be 
unbreakable by known methods in typical large computer facilities -assuming it is used properly.  
A small Intranet environment - A 10 Mbps Ethernet connected 2 PCs. Each PC was directly attached 
to an unswitched hub. The Web servers ran on a PC with a 2 GHz Pentium, 1 GB RAM and a fast 
Ethernet card, running NT. The clients ran on a PC, also running NT, with a 1 GHz Pentium with 512 
MB RAM and an NE 2000 NIC Ethernet card.  
Performance was measured in a no-load situation-during the experiments the PCs were otherwise 
unused and the hub was lightly used. In addition, during the experiments neither machine paged virtual 
memory.  
We call our measurement apparatus WebPerf. WebPerf consists of a Web robot client and a back-end 
database. The robot measures Web response times and other parameters and stores the results in the 
database. The robot was written by one of us-Buff-in C++ and compiled with Visual C++ version with 
optimization. It communicates via Winsock. 
To minimize contention with itself the robot browser runs single-threaded on an otherwise idle 
machine.  
A widespread SSL implementation was integrated into the robot by one of us-Schmitt. SSL version 
0.8.1 was used. It supports SSL versions 3.0. The robot does not authenticate the server since this is a 
client side activity.  
Netscape Enterprise Server and Microsoft IIS were both installed on the server PC. Two identical Web 
sites were created with 24 documents of sizes 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, ..., 20,000, 40,000, 60,000, 80,000, 
100,000 bytes. This size distribution is similar to that of documents requested on the Web as observed 
in traces from an Internet Service Provider and an Intranet in 1998. The documents contained typical 
HTML text (actually, the beginning of the HTTP/1.1 specification).  
The robot browser sequentially requested each of the 24 documents many times. The robot measured 
the duration at the client between just before the client robot issued the SSL_write() of the request and 
just after the client completed the SSL_read() of the response. This measures the streaming application 
layer encryption performance. The costs of additional delays for establishing SSL connections were 
presented elsewhere.  
This duration and many other measures are stored in an Oracle SQL database after the measurements 
have been made.  
The word cryptography is derived from the two Greek words kryptós (“secret”) and gráfo (“write”) 
and is the science of message security. It is an ancient mathematical subject and has only recently 
become a branch of information security. By using a key it is possible to use a cipher to transform a 
readable message, plaintext, into an unreadable message, ciphertext. This procedure is known as 
encryption. The very same key or a related key can be used to do the inverse transformation, 
decryption. This part  will introduce different cryptographic algorithms and describe some computer 
security fundamentals. 
 
1.4 Cryptography 
 
Cryptography is the task of transforming information into a form that is incomprehensible, but at the 
same time allows the intended recipient to retrieve the original information using a secret key. 
Cryptography is a Greek word that literally means the art of writing secrets. Cryptographic algorithms 
(or ciphers, as they are often called) are special programs designed to protect sensitive information on 
public communication networks. During encryption, ciphers transform the original plaintext message 
into unintelligible ciphertext. Decryption is the process of retrieving plaintext from ciphertext. Two 
forms of cryptography are commonly used in information systems today: secret-key ciphers and 
public-key ciphers. Secret-key ciphers (sometimes referred to as symmetric-key ciphers) use a single 
private key to encrypt and decrypt as illustrated in Figure 1. Public-key ciphers (or asymmetric-key 
ciphers) use a well-known public key to encrypt and require a different private key to decrypt. The 
process may also be reversed to produce what is known as a digital signature. Digital signatures 
authenticate the sender. Since only the person holding the private key knows its value, only that person 
can create a digital signature that others can decrypt with the public key. 
The main purpose of the digital certificate is to ensure that the public key contained in the certificate 
belongs to the entity to which the certificate was issued.  
Encryption techniques using public and private keys require a public-key infrastructure (PKI) to 
support the distribution and identification of public keys. Digital certificates package public keys, 
information about the algorithms used, owner or subject data, the digital signature of a Certificate 
Authority that has verified the subject data, and a date range during which the certificate can be 
considered valid.  
 
Without certificates, it would be possible to create a new key pair and distribute the public key, 
claiming that it is the public key for almost anyone. You could send data encrypted with the private 
key and the public key would be used to decrypt the data, but there would be no assurance that the data 
was originated by anyone in particular. All the receiver would know is that a valid key pair was used. 
Algorithms used for encryption/decryption fall into two categories: symmetric-key and public-key 
cryptography.  
 
Symmetric-key Cryptography 
 
In symmetric-key algorithms, the sender and receiver have the same set of keys and use the same 
algorithms to encrypt and decrypt messages. The keys used for encryption and decryption can differ 
but there is a transform to go from one key to the other. Most of the cryptographic research this 
century has been into symmetric key technology. A symmetric key cipher uses a secret sequence of 
characters or key to scramble any amount of plaintext into a unique ciphertext. A different key, used to 
scramble the same plaintext, will yield a completely different ciphertext. The plaintext is recovered by 
rerunning the same algorithm with the same key over the ciphertext. There are two types of symmetric 
cipher in common usage: The block cipher takes a fixed length of plaintext (called the block size) and 
generates the same amount of ciphertext. If the total length of the plaintext is not a multiple of the 
block size, then padding data may be used to make up the difference on the last block of plaintext. The 
stream cipher converts plaintext to ciphertext one bit at a time. 
 
Public-key Cryptography 
 
Public-key cryptography is also known as asymmetric cryptography. Different keys are used in each 
direction. The sender and receiver both have two keys. One is public and is known by all and one is 
private and is only known by the keeper. This form of cryptography was introduced in the 1970s and 
solves some of the problems with symmetric-keys. Public-key cryptosystems differ from their 
symmetric key counterparts in that they use a private key for decrypting and a public key for 
encrypting rather than having a single key to do both. Although the public and private keys are 
mathematically related, the private key cannot feasibly be computed from the public key, so making it 
safe to publish the public key anywhere. This is achieved by relating the two keys through a 
mathematical .trap-door. function. A trap-door function is one which is easy to compute in one 
direction, but which has an inverse which is much more difficult to calculate. So in the case of public-
key cryptography, creating the two keys from scratch is easy but attempting to find one from the other 
is hard. In the Diffie-Hellman system, the trapdoor function used is the discrete logarithm. Whereas the 
RSA setup uses factorisation of large numbers. It is important to realise that although both these 
problems are thought to be as hard as each other, no one has ever proved that they are mathematically 
.hard. to break. On the other hand no one has ever proved that they are mathematically .easy. to find 
either. A theoretical breakthrough along either path would significantly strengthen or weaken public-
key cryptography. RSA relies on the use of large numbers for its security, these large numbers are 
measured in bit length. A similar discussion to that in the symmetric cipher realm exists concerning 
how many bits make up a secure RSA key [RIV93]. Recently a 129 digit number was factorised in an 
8 month distributed software effort; 129 digits equates to a 429 bit key. It is now recommended people 
use at least 700 bit keys for security. Encryption and decryption are also inverse operations, no matter 
which order they are carried out in. This is useful for digital signatures 
 
Digital Certificate 
 
To verify that a certain public key belongs to an identity, a digital certificate can be used. A digital 
certificate binds a public key to an identity. To be able to trust that the sender of a certificate is the real 
owner, a third party needs to be involved. A trusted third party can sign a certificate by encrypting it 
with a private key. The third part is usually a Certificate Authority (CA). A CA is an organization that 
provides signing of certificates. It is also possible for the certificate owner to sign the certificate 
himself. A signed certificate contains an encrypted checksum, signature. A commonly used certificate 
format is the Directory Authentication Framework (X.509).  X.509 defines what should be present in a 
certificate. This includes the identity, public key information of the issuer and owner and validity 
interval. It is validated by obtaining the public key of the issuer and decrypting the signature. A hash of 
all other data is calculated and should match the decrypted signature. The validity interval is checked 
to ensure that this certificate has not expired. The user can now use the public key of the certificate 
owner to continue the communication.  
Server Certificates: 
Server certificates identify servers that participate in secure communications with other computers 
using communication protocols such as SSL. These certificates allow a server to verify its identity to 
clients. Server certificates follow the X.509 certificate format that is defined by the Public-Key 
Cryptography Standards (PKCS).  
 
Software Publisher Certificates: 
Microsoft Authenticode does not guarantee that signed code is safe to run, but rather informs the user 
whether or not the publisher is participating in the infrastructure of trusted publishers and CAs. These 
certificates are used to sign software to be distributed over the Internet.  
Authenticode requires a software publisher certificate to sign Microsoft ActiveX and other compiled 
code. Internet Explorer is also capable of trusting software that is signed with a publisher's certificate.  
 
To view a list of trusted software publishers in Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools 
menu, click the Content tab, and then click Publishers. You can also remove trusted publishers by 
clicking Remove in this screen.  
 
Certificate Authority Certificates: 
Internet Explorer 5 divides CAs into two categories, Root Certification Authorities and Intermediate 
Certification Authorities. Root certificates are self-signed, meaning that the subject of the certificate is 
also the signer of the certificate. Root Certification Authorities have the ability to assign certificates for 
Intermediate Certification Authorities. An Intermediate Certification Authority has the ability to issue 
server certificates, personal certificates, publisher certificates, or certificates for other Intermediate 
Certification Authorities.  
 
For example, if you click Certificates on the Content tab in the Internet Explorer Properties dialog box, 
a list of certificates that are installed on your computer is displayed. There is a trusted Root Authority 
listed as "Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority" (which is run by VeriSign). This certificate 
is issued and signed by the Class 1 Public Primary Certificate Authority, and is therefore a root 
certificate. On the Intermediate Certification Authorities tab, there are several certificates listed as 
"VeriSign Class 1 CA." The root certificate mentioned above issued these certificates. These 
Intermediate Certificate Authorities were created for the purpose of issuing and validating personal 
digital certificates, so if a person has obtained a Class 1 personal digital certificate from VeriSign, it 
will be issued by one of these Intermediate CAs. This creates what is known as a verification chain. In 
this case, there are only three certificates in the verification chain for a personal certificate. However, 
verification chains can contain a large number of certificates depending upon the number of 
Intermediate Certification Authorities in the chain. 
 
 1.5 Hash Functions 
 
A hash function takes an input of arbitrary size and produces an output, a message digest or checksum, 
of fixed size. The most important property of a hash function is that the original message cannot be 
generated from the message digest. Another important property is that two different messages have a 
very low probability of resulting in the same message digest, a collision. Hash functions can be used to 
add a message digest to the end of a sent message. The receiver can, if the algorithm for creating the 
message digest is known, verify the message digest. If the receiver calculates the message digest from 
the message and gets the same result, the message can be assumed to be free from accidental, but not 
necessarily of intentional modifications. A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure 
that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string, the (cryptographic) hash value, 
such that an accidental or intentional change to the data will change the hash value. The data to be 
encoded is often called the "message", and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or 
simply digest. 
 
The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main properties: 
it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message, 
it is infeasible to find a message that has a given hash, 
it is infeasible to modify a message without changing its hash, 
it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash. 
 
The basic requirements for a cryptographic hash function are:  
the input can be of any length,  
the output has a fixed length,  
H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x ,  
H(x) is one-way,  
H(x) is collision-free. 
 
Cryptographic hash functions have many information security applications, notably in digital 
signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and other forms of authentication. They can also be 
used as ordinary hash functions, to index data in hash tables; as fingerprints, to detect duplicate data or 
uniquely identify files; or as checksums to detect accidental data corruption. Indeed, in information 
security contexts, cryptographic hash values are sometimes called (digital) fingerprints, checksums, or 
just hash values, even though all these terms stand for functions with rather different properties and 
purposes. 
 
Properties 
 
Most cryptographic hash functions are designed to take a string of any length as input and produce a 
fixed-length hash value. 
 
A cryptographic hash function must be able to withstand all known types of cryptanalytic attack. As a 
minimum, it must have the following properties: 
Preimage resistance: given a hash h it should be hard to find any message m such that h = hash(m). 
This concept is related to that of one way function. Functions that lack this property are vulnerable to 
preimage attacks. 
Second preimage resistance: given an input m1, it should be hard to find another input, m2 (not equal 
to m1) such that hash(m1) = hash(m2). This property is sometimes referred to as weak collision 
resistance. Functions that lack this property are vulnerable to second preimage attacks. 
Collision resistance: it should be hard to find two different messages m1 and m2 such that hash(m1) = 
hash(m2). Such a pair is called a (cryptographic) hash collision, and this property is sometimes 
referred to as strong collision resistance. It requires a hash value at least twice as long as what is 
required for preimage-resistance, otherwise collisions may be found by a birthday attack. 
 
These properties imply that a malicious adversary can not replace or modify the input data without 
changing its digest. Thus, if two strings have the same digest, one can be very confident that they are 
identical. 
 
A function meeting these criteria may still have undesirable properties. Currently popular 
cryptographic hash functions are vulnerable to length-extension attacks: given h(m) and len(m) but not 
m, by choosing a suitable m' an attacker can calculate h (m || m'), where || denotes concatenation. This 
property can be used to break naive authentication schemes based on hash functions. The HMAC 
construction works around these problems. 
 
Ideally, one may wish for even stronger conditions. It should be impossible for an adversary to find 
two messages with substantially similar digests; or to infer any useful information about the data, 
given only its digest. Therefore, a cryptographic hash function should behave as much as possible like 
a random function while still being deterministic and efficiently computable. 
 Checksum algorithms, such as CRC32 and other cyclic redundancy checks, are designed to meet much 
weaker requirements, and are generally unsuitable as cryptographic hash functions. For example, a 
CRC was used for message integrity in the WEP encryption standard, but an attack was readily 
discovered which exploited the linearity of the checksum. 
 
Applications 
 
A typical use of a cryptographic hash would be as follows: Alice poses a tough math problem to Bob, 
and claims she has solved it. Bob would like to try it himself, but would yet like to be sure that Alice is 
not bluffing. Therefore, Alice writes down her solution, appends a random nonce, computes its hash 
and tells Bob the hash value (whilst keeping the solution and nonce secret). This way, when Bob 
comes up with the solution himself a few days later, Alice can prove that she had the solution earlier 
by revealing the nonce to Bob. (This is an example of a simple commitment scheme; in actual practice, 
Alice and Bob will often be computer programs, and the secret would be something less easily spoofed 
than a claimed puzzle solution). 
 
Another important application of secure hashes is verification of message integrity. Determining 
whether any changes have been made to a message (or a file), for example, can be accomplished by 
comparing message digests calculated before, and after, transmission (or any other event). 
 
A message digest can also serve as a means of reliably identifying a file; several source code 
management systems, including Git, Mercurial and Monotone, use the sha1sum of various types of 
content (file content, directory trees, ancestry information, etc) to uniquely identify them. 
 
A related application is password verification. Passwords are usually not stored in cleartext, for 
obvious reasons, but instead in digest form. To authenticate a user, the password presented by the user 
is hashed and compared with the stored hash. This is sometimes referred to as one-way encryption. 
 
For both security and performance reasons, most digital signature algorithms specify that only the 
digest of the message be "signed", not the entire message. Hash functions can also be used in the 
generation of pseudorandom bits. 
 
Hashes are used to identify files on peer-to-peer filesharing networks. For example, in an ed2k link, an 
MD4-variant hash is combined with the file size, providing sufficient information for locating file 
sources, downloading the file and verifying its contents. Magnet links are another example. Such file 
hashes are often the top hash of a hash list or a hash tree which allows for additional benefits. 
 
[edit] 
Hash functions based on block ciphers 
 
There are several methods to use a block cipher to build a cryptographic hash function, specifically a 
one-way compression function. 
 
The methods resemble the block cipher modes of operation usually used for encryption. All well-
known hash functions, including MD4, MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2 are built from block-cipher-like 
components designed for the purpose, with feedback to ensure that the resulting function is not 
bijective. 
 
A standard block cipher such as AES can be used in place of these custom block ciphers; this generally 
carries a cost in performance, but can be advantageous where a system needs to perform hashing and 
another cryptographic function such as encryption that might use a block cipher, but is constrained in 
the code size or hardware area it must fit into, such as in some embedded systems like smart cards. 
 
1.6 Cryptographic hash algorithms 
 
There is a long list of cryptographic hash functions, although many have been found to be vulnerable 
and should not be used. Even if a hash function has never been broken, a successful attack against a 
weakened variant thereof may undermine the experts' confidence and lead to its abandonment. For 
instance, in August 2004 weaknesses were found in a number of hash functions that were popular at 
the time, including SHA-0, RIPEMD, and MD5. This has called into question the long-term security of 
later algorithms which are derived from these hash functions — in particular, SHA-1 (a strengthened 
version of SHA-0), RIPEMD-128, and RIPEMD-160 (both strengthened versions of RIPEMD). 
Neither SHA-0 nor RIPEMD are widely used since they were replaced by their strengthened versions. 
 
As of 2009, the two most commonly used cryptographic hash functions are MD5 and SHA-1. 
However, MD5 has been broken; an attack against it was used to break SSL in 2008. 
 
SHA-0 and SHA-1 are members of the SHA family of hash functions developed by the NSA. In 
February 2005, a successful attack on SHA-1 was reported, finding collisions in about 269 hashing 
operations, rather than the 280 expected for a 160-bit hash function. In August 2005, another 
successful attack on SHA-1 was reported, finding collisions in 263 operations. Theoretical weaknesses 
of SHA-1 exist as well, suggesting that it may be practical to break within years. New applications can 
avoid these problems by using more advanced members of the SHA family, such as SHA-2, or using 
techniques such as randomized hashing that do not require collision resistance. 
 
However, to ensure the long-term robustness of applications that use hash functions, there is a 
competition to design a replacement for SHA-2, which will be given the name SHA-3 and become a 
FIPS standard around 2012. 
 
Some of the following algorithms are known to be insecure; consult the article for each specific 
algorithm for more information on the status of each algorithm. Note that this list does not include 
candidates in the current NIST hash function competition. For additional hash functions see the box at 
the bottom of the page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2.   
Background 
2.1. HTTP and HTTPS connection 
We can create HTTP connections in Java applications using the HTTP protocol handling code built in 
to the Java Developer’s Kit, and HTTPS connections using the HTTPS protocol handler provided with 
EAServer.  
HTTP connections 
The standard Java virtual machine provides HTTP connectivity with these classes in java.net package: 
URL allows you to use Uniform Resource Locator strings for HTTP connections and other protocol 
connections that can be represented by URLs. 
 URLConnection represents a connection to a server and resource indicated by a URL. 
 HttpURLConnection extends URL with additional methods that are specific to the HTTP 
protocol.  
The following code shows a typical example. This code opens a connection, retrieves the data (text is 
assumed), and prints it: 
URL url = new URL("http://www.site.com/"); 
URLConnection conn = url.openConnection(); 
conn.connect(); 
InputStreamReader content  
    = new InputStreamReader(conn.getInputStream()); 
for (int i=0; i != -1; i = content.read()) 
{ 
    System.out.print((char) i);   
}  
 
HTTPS connections 
The procedure for creating HTTPS connections is similar to that for HTTP connections, except that 
you must install EAServer’s HTTPS protocol handler in the Java virtual machine and configure SSL 
parameters before opening a connection. 
System requirements EAServer’s HTTPS protocol handler uses the same SSL implementation as used 
by Java and C++ clients and requires a full client runtime install.  
Installing the HTTPS protocol handler 
The EAServer HTTPS protocol handler can be installed two ways: 
 By configuring the java.protocol.handler.pkgs Java system property, making it the default 
handler for all HTTPS URLs. This is the recommended approach if you do not need to use another 
vendor’s HTTPS protocol handler in addition to the EAServer implementation. 
 By calling one of the java.net.URL constructors that takes a java.net.URLStreamHandler as a 
parameter. This approach must be used if you must use more than one HTTPS protocol handler in 
one EAServer or in one client application. 
Configuring the default protocol handlers 
The java.protocol.handler.pkgs Java system property configures the Java virtual machine default URL 
protocol handlers. To use the EAServer handlers, you must add com.sybase.jaguar.net to the list. 
In a client application, specify this property on the command line; for example:  
jre -Djava.protocol.handler.pkgs=com.sybase.jaguar.net ... 
For an EAServer, set the JVM options property using the Advanced tab in the Server Properties dialog 
box: 
  
 
 
Property Value 
com.sybase.jaguar.server.jv
m.options 
If not already set, set to: 
-java.protocol.handler.pkgs=com.sybase.jaguar.net 
If already set, verify that the value includes this option. JVM 
options must be separated with a comma. 
 
You can specify more than one package by separating package names with a character, but you can 
configure only one handler per protocol. If you must use more than one HTTPS protocol handler in 
one EAServer or in one client application, you must call one of the java.net.URL constructors that 
takes a java.net.URLStreamHandler as a parameter. The specified java.net.URLStreamHandler 
instance overrides the default handler for the protocol specified by the URL. For example, to specify 
the EAServer HTTPS handler, use code like this: 
import java.net.*; 
import com.sybase.jaguar.net.JagURLStreamHandlerFactory; 
import com.sybase.jaguar.net.HttpsURLConnection; 
.... 
String url_string = "https://localhost:8081/index.html"; 
// The URL stream handler factory is required to create a stream 
// handler. 
JagURLStreamHandlerFactory fact = new JagURLStreamHandlerFactory(); 
// Extract the protocol from the front of the URL string 
String protocol = url_string.substring(0, url_string.indexOf(":")); 
// If the protocol is HTTPS, use the EAServer HTTPS handler. Otherwise, 
// use the default handler 
java.net.URL url; 
if (protocol.equals("https")) 
{ 
    url = new URL((URL)null, url_string, 
        fact.createURLStreamHandler(protocol)); 
} else 
{ 
    url = new URL(url_string); 
} 
EAServer’s HttpsURLConnection class 
EAServer provides the com.sybase.jaguar.net.HttpsURLConnection class to support HTTPS 
connectivity. This class extends java.net.URLConnection and implements all methods of 
java.net.HttpURLConnection. HttpsURLConnection provides these additional methods specifically for 
SSL support: 
 A setSSLProperty method with signature: 
 void setSSLProperty (String prop, String value) throws 
   CtsSecurity.InvalidPropertyException, 
   CtsSecurity.InvalidValueException 
Call this method to set the SSL properties described in “SSL properties”. 
 A setSSLProperties method with signature: 
 void setSSLProperty (java.util.Properties props) throws 
   CtsSecurity.InvalidPropertyException, 
   CtsSecurity.InvalidValueException 
This method is the same as setSSLProperty, but allows you to set multiple properties with one call. 
 A getSSLProperty method with signature: 
 String[] setSSLProperty (String prop) throws 
   CtsSecurity.InvalidPropertyException 
Call this method to retrieve the SSL properties described in “SSL properties”. 
 A setGlobalProperty method with signature: 
 void setGlobalProperty (String prop, String value) throws 
   CtsSecurity.InvalidPropertyException, 
   CtsSecurity.InvalidValueException 
 Properties set with this method affect the handling of all HTTPS connections, not just the current one. 
 A getGlobalProperty method with signature: 
 String[] getGlobalProperty(String prop) throws 
   CtsSecurity.InvalidPropertyException; 
Call this method to retrieve the global SSL properties described in “SSL properties”. 
 A getSessionInfo method with signature: 
 CtsSecurity.SSLSessionInfo getSessionInfo() throws CtsSecurity.SSLException 
The SSLSessionInfo methods allow you to determine the SSL session properties, such as the server’s 
address, the client certificate in use, the server certificate in use, and so forth. For more information, 
see the Interface Repository documentation for the CtsSecurity::SSLSessionInfo IDL interface. 
getSessionInfo throws an a SSLException instance if SSL is not used on the connection. 
Creating HTTPS connections 
1. Configure or install the EAServer HTTPS protocol handler as described in “Installing the 
HTTPS protocol handler”. 
2. Create URL and URLConnection instances. If connecting to an EAServer, specify the address 
of an HTTPS listener that supports the desired level of security. For example: 
3. URL url = new URL("https://myhost:8081/index.html"); 
4. URLConnection conn = url.openConnection(); 
5. Verify that the object returned by URL.openConnection is of class 
com.sybase.jaguar.net.HttpsURLConnection, then set SSL properties for the connection. “SSL 
properties” describes the SSL properties that can be set. At a minimum, you must specify the qop and 
pin properties, as well as the certificateLabel property if using mutual authentication. For example: 
6. if (conn instanceof HttpsURLConnection) 
7. { 
8.   HttpsURLConnection https_conn =     (HttpsURLConnection) conn; 
9.   try 
10.   { 
11.     https_conn.setSSLProperty( "qop","sybpks_intl" );  
12.     https_conn.setSSLProperty( "pin", "secret"); 
13.     https_conn.setSSLProperty( 
14.            "certificateLabel", "John Smith"); 
15.   }  
16.   catch ( CtsSecurity.InvalidPropertyException ipe ) 
17.   { 
18.     System.err.println( ipe ); 
19.   } 
20.   catch ( CtsSecurity.InvalidValueException ive ) 
21.   { 
22.     System.err.println( ive ); 
23.   } 
24. Open the connection, for example: 
25. conn.connect(); 
Once the connection is open, you can perform any valid operation for a connection that uses 
java.net.HTTPUrlConnection. You can also call the getSessionInfo method to retrieve a 
CtsSecurity.SSLSessionInfo instance that allows you to verify the SSL connection parameters. For 
example: 
java.net.URLConnection conn; 
... deleted code that constructed URLConnection ... 
if (conn instanceof HttpsURLConnection) 
{ 
  HttpsURLConnection https_conn =     (HttpsURLConnection) conn; 
  CtsSecurity.SSLSessionInfo sessInfo =  
    https_conn.getSessionInfo(); 
The SSLSessionInfo methods allow you to determine the SSL session properties, such as the server’s 
address, the client certificate in use, the server certificate in use, and so forth. For more information, 
see the Interface Repository documentation for the CtsSecurity::SSLSessionInfo interface. 
2.2 SSL 
Global properties are set and read with the getGlobalProperty and setGlobalProperty methods. Global 
properties affect all HTTPS connections, not just the HttpsUrlConnection instance on which they are 
set. The right column in Table 3 lists which methods are valid for each property. 
Some properties, if not set or set incorrectly, cause the connection to invoke an SSL callback method. 
You can install a callback to respond to these cases with the callbackImpl global property. If you do 
not install an SSL callback, the default callback implementation aborts the connection attempt. To use 
SSL, you must specify the name of an available security characteristic as the value for the qop 
property. The characteristic describes the CipherSuites the client uses when negotiating an SSL 
connection. When connecting, the client sends the list of CipherSuites that it uses to the server, and the 
server selects a cipher suite from that list. The server chooses the first cipher suite in the list that it can 
use. If the server cannot use any of the available CipherSuites, the connection fails. 
 Figure 2.1    Insertion of SSL protocols 
The Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) governs the transport and routing of 
data over the Internet. Other protocols, such as the HyperText Transport Protocol (HTTP), Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), or Internet Messaging Access Protocol (IMAP), run "on top of" 
TCP/IP in the sense that they all use TCP/IP to support typical application tasks such as displaying 
web pages or running email servers.  
 
 
Figure 2.2    SSL runs above TCP/IP and below high-level application protocols  
The SSL protocol runs above TCP/IP and below higher-level protocols such as HTTP or IMAP. It uses 
TCP/IP on behalf of the higher-level protocols, and in the process allows an SSL-enabled server to 
authenticate itself to an SSL-enabled client, allows the client to authenticate itself to the server, and 
allows both machines to establish an encrypted connection.  
These capabilities address fundamental concerns about communication over the Internet and other 
TCP/IP networks:  
 SSL server authentication allows a user to confirm a server's identity. SSL-enabled client 
software can use standard techniques of public-key cryptography to check that a server's 
certificate and public ID are valid and have been issued by a certificate authority (CA) listed in 
the client's list of trusted CAs. This confirmation might be important if the user, for example, is 
sending a credit card number over the network and wants to check the receiving server's 
identity.  
 SSL client authentication allows a server to confirm a user's identity. Using the same 
techniques as those used for server authentication, SSL-enabled server software can check that 
a client's certificate and public ID are valid and have been issued by a certificate authority (CA) 
listed in the server's list of trusted CAs. This confirmation might be important if the server, for 
example, is a bank sending confidential financial information to a customer and wants to check 
the recipient's identity.  
 An encrypted SSL connection requires all information sent between a client and a server to be 
encrypted by the sending software and decrypted by the receiving software, thus providing a 
high degree of confidentiality. Confidentiality is important for both parties to any private 
transaction. In addition, all data sent over an encrypted SSL connection is protected with a 
mechanism for detecting tampering--that is, for automatically determining whether the data has 
been altered in transit.  
 
The SSL protocol includes two sub-protocols: the SSL record protocol and the SSL handshake 
protocol. The SSL record protocol defines the format used to transmit data. The SSL handshake 
protocol involves using the SSL record protocol to exchange a series of messages between an SSL-
enabled server and an SSL-enabled client when they first establish an SSL connection. This exchange 
of messages is designed to facilitate the following actions:  
 Authenticate the server to the client.  
 Allow the client and server to select the cryptographic algorithms, or ciphers, that they both 
support.  
 Optionally authenticate the client to the server.  
 Use public-key encryption techniques to generate shared secrets.  
 Establish an encrypted SSL connection.  
  
 
 Figure 2.3    SSL protocols installations 
2.3 The SSL Handshake  
The SSL protocol uses a combination of public-key and symmetric key encryption. Symmetric key 
encryption is much faster than public-key encryption, but public-key encryption provides better 
authentication techniques. An SSL session always begins with an exchange of messages called the 
SSL handshake. The handshake allows the server to authenticate itself to the client using public-key 
techniques, then allows the client and the server to cooperate in the creation of symmetric keys used 
for rapid encryption, decryption, and tamper detection during the session that follows. Optionally, the 
handshake also allows the client to authenticate itself to the server.  
The exact programmatic details of the messages exchanged during the SSL handshake are beyond the 
scope of this document. However, the steps involved can be summarized as follows (assuming the use 
of the cipher suites listed in Cipher Suites with RSA Key Exchange):  
1. The client sends the server the client's SSL version number, cipher settings, randomly 
generated data, and other information the server needs to communicate with the client using 
SSL.  
2. The server sends the client the server's SSL version number, cipher settings, randomly 
generated data, and other information the client needs to communicate with the server over 
SSL. The server also sends its own certificate and, if the client is requesting a server resource 
that requires client authentication, requests the client's certificate.  
3. The client uses some of the information sent by the server to authenticate the server (see Server 
Authentication for details). If the server cannot be authenticated, the user is warned of the 
problem and informed that an encrypted and authenticated connection cannot be established. If 
the server can be successfully authenticated, the client goes on to Step 4.  
4. Using all data generated in the handshake so far, the client (with the cooperation of the server, 
depending on the cipher being used) creates the premaster secret for the session, encrypts it 
with the server's public key (obtained from the server's certificate, sent in Step 2), and sends the 
encrypted premaster secret to the server.  
5. If the server has requested client authentication (an optional step in the handshake), the client 
also signs another piece of data that is unique to this handshake and known by both the client 
and server. In this case the client sends both the signed data and the client's own certificate to 
the server along with the encrypted premaster secret.  
6. If the server has requested client authentication, the server attempts to authenticate the client 
(see Client Authentication for details). If the client cannot be authenticated, the session is 
terminated. If the client can be successfully authenticated, the server uses its private key to 
decrypt the premaster secret, then performs a series of steps (which the client also performs, 
starting from the same premaster secret) to generate the master secret.  
7. Both the client and the server use the master secret to generate the session keys, which are 
symmetric keys used to encrypt and decrypt information exchanged during the SSL session and 
to verify its integrity--that is, to detect any changes in the data between the time it was sent and 
the time it is received over the SSL connection.  
8. The client sends a message to the server informing it that future messages from the client will 
be encrypted with the session key. It then sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that 
the client portion of the handshake is finished.  
9. The server sends a message to the client informing it that future messages from the server will 
be encrypted with the session key. It then sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that 
the server portion of the handshake is finished.  
10. The SSL handshake is now complete, and the SSL session has begun. The client and the server 
use the session keys to encrypt and decrypt the data they send to each other and to validate its 
integrity.  
Before continuing with the session, Netscape servers can be configured to check that the client's 
certificate is present in the user's entry in an LDAP directory. This configuration option provides one 
way of ensuring that the client's certificate has not been revoked.  
It's important to note that both client and server authentication involves encrypting some piece of data 
with one key of a public-private key pair and decrypting it with the other key:  
 In the case of server authentication, the client encrypts the premaster secret with the server's 
public key. Only the corresponding private key can correctly decrypt the secret, so the client 
has some assurance that the identity associated with the public key is in fact the server with 
which the client is connected. Otherwise, the server cannot decrypt the premaster secret and 
cannot generate the symmetric keys required for the session, and the session will be terminated.  
 In the case of client authentication, the client encrypts some random data with the client's 
private key--that is, it creates a digital signature. The public key in the client's certificate can 
correctly validate the digital signature only if the corresponding private key was used. 
Otherwise, the server cannot validate the digital signature and the session is terminated.  
Message Type Direction Data Transfered 
client-hello C > S  challenge-data, cipher-specs 
server-hello C < S connection-id, server-certificate, cipher-specs 
 client-master-key C > S cipher-kind, clear-master-key, {secret-master-key}server-
public-key 
 
client-finish C > S {connection-id}client-write-key 
server-verify C < S {challenge-data}server-write-key 
 
server-finish C < S {session-id}server-write-key 
 
Table of SSL messages: no session-id, no client authentication 
The client-hello message sends the server some challenge-data and a list of ciphers which the client 
can support. The challenge-data is used to authenticate the server later on. The server-hello message 
returns a connection-id, a server certificate and a modified list of ciphers which the client and server 
can both support. The server certificate is used by the client to obtain the servers public key and verify 
the identity of the server using any certification authority certificates it has. 
The client-master-key message is sent in the clear with respect to the SSL record protocol. In this 
message, the client sends the final choice of cipher (chosen from the cipher list it received from the 
server-hello message) and the master key sent in two parts. If the chosen cipher is an export grade 
cipher then 88 bits of the master key are sent unencrypted and only 40 bits are sent encrypted with the 
servers public key. If on the other hand the client has selected a full strength cipher then the entire key 
is sent encrypted with the server's public key and the clear-master-key field is empty. 
From this point in the handshaking all messages are encrypted at the SSL Record Protocol level. It 
should be noted that the master key is not actually used as a key for the bulk encryption directly, rather 
it is used to calculate two sets of keys which are. From now on when the client sends a message to the 
server, the client uses the client-write-key to encrypt and the server uses the server-read-key to decrypt 
(client-write-key is the same as server-readkey). Similarly when the server sends a message to the 
client, the server uses the server-writekey to encrypt and the client uses the client-read-key to decrypt 
(server-write-key is the same as client-read-key). It is these two sets of keys which are calculated from 
the client-masterkey. Some ciphers require more than one actual key to encrypt and decrypt , so the 
various write keys and read keys may consist of more than one actual key. This is the reason that the 
actual session key is not sent and a master key is used.  
The client-finish message consists of the connection-id originally sent by the server. The connection-id 
acts as a nonce value which prevents certain attacks. The message is encrypted using the client-write-
key. The server-verify message contains the challenge-data originally sent by the client. The receipt 
and decryption of this message is the final stage of server authentication in that only the real server 
should have the private key necessary to decrypt the secret-master-key in the client-master-key 
message. This message is encrypted using the server-write-key. Finally the server-finish message 
terminates the handshaking section. It contains a new piece of data generated by the server called the 
session-id. The session-id is used in subsequent handshakes between the same client and server to 
avoid having to go through all the cipher and master key negotiation again. Session-ids are cached by 
each party after a connection is closed and only reused for subsequent connections if they do not occur 
too far apart. It is recommended that a session-id have a 100 second life in a cache before being 
discarded. 
2.4. Server Authentication  
Netscape's SSL-enabled client software always requires server authentication, or cryptographic 
validation by a client of the server's identity. As explained in Step 2 of The SSL Handshake, the server 
sends the client a certificate to authenticate itself. The client uses the certificate in Step 3 to 
authenticate the identity the certificate claims to represent.  
To authenticate the binding between a public key and the server identified by the certificate that 
contains the public key, an SSL-enabled client must receive a "yes" answer to the four questions 
shown in Figure 2. Although the fourth question is not technically part of the SSL protocol, it is the 
client's responsibility to support this requirement, which provides some assurance of the server's 
identity and thus helps protect against a form of security attack known as "man in the middle."  
s 
Figure 2.4    How a Netscape client authenticates a server certificate 
An SSL-enabled client goes through these steps to authenticate a server's identity:  
1. The client checks the server certificate's validity period. If the current date and time are outside 
of that range, the authentication process won't go any further. If the current date and time are 
within the certificate's validity period, the client goes on to Step 2.  
2. Each SSL-enabled client maintains a list of trusted CA certificates, represented by the shaded 
area on the right side of Figure 2. This list determines which server certificates the client will 
accept. If the distinguished name (DN) of the issuing CA matches the DN of a CA on the 
client's list of trusted CAs, the answer to this question is yes, and the client goes on to Step 3. If 
the issuing CA is not on the list, the server will not be authenticated unless the client can verify 
a certificate chain ending in a CA that is on the list (see CA Hierarchies for details).  
3. The client uses the public key from the CA's certificate (which it found in its list of trusted CAs 
in step 2) to validate the CA's digital signature on the server certificate being presented. If the 
information in the server certificate has changed since it was signed by the CA or if the CA 
certificate's public key doesn't correspond to the private key used by the CA to sign the server 
certificate, the client won't authenticate the server's identity. If the CA's digital signature can be 
validated, the server treats the user's certificate as a valid "letter of introduction" from that CA 
and proceeds. At this point, the client has determined that the server certificate is valid. It is the 
client's responsibility to take Step 4 before Step 5.  
4. This step confirms that the server is actually located at the same network address specified by 
the domain name in the server certificate. Although step 4 is not technically part of the SSL 
protocol, it provides the only protection against a form of security attack known as a Man-in-
the-Middle Attack. Clients must perform this step and must refuse to authenticate the server or 
establish a connection if the domain names don't match. If the server's actual domain name 
matches the domain name in the server certificate, the client goes on to Step 5.  
5. The server is authenticated. The client proceeds with the SSL handshake. If the client doesn't 
get to step 5 for any reason, the server identified by the certificate cannot be authenticated, and 
the user will be warned of the problem and informed that an encrypted and authenticated 
connection cannot be established. If the server requires client authentication, the server 
performs the steps described in Client Authentication.  
After the steps described here, the server must successfully use its private key to decrypt the 
premaster secret the client sends in Step 4 of The SSL Handshake. Otherwise, the SSL session will 
be terminated. This provides additional assurance that the identity associated with the public key in 
the server's certificate is in fact the server with which the  client is connected. 
 
An SSL-enabled server goes through these steps to authenticate a user's identity: 
1. The server checks that the user's digital signature can be validated with the public key in the 
certificate. If so, the server has established that the public key asserted to belong to John Doe 
matches the private key used to create the signature and that the data has not been tampered 
with since it was signed. At this point, however, the binding between the public key and the 
DN specified in the certificate has not yet been established. The certificate might have been 
created by someone attempting to impersonate the user. To validate the binding between the 
public key and the DN, the server must also complete Step 3 and Step 4.  
2. The server checks the certificate's validity period. If the current date and time are outside of 
that range, the authentication process won't go any further. If the current date and time are 
within the certificate's validity period, the server goes on to Step 3.  
3. Each SSL-enabled server maintains a list of trusted CA certificates, represented by the shaded 
area on the right side of Figure 3. This list determines which certificates the server will accept. 
If the DN of the issuing CA matches the DN of a CA on the server's list of trusted CAs, the 
answer to this question is yes, and the server goes on to Step 4. If the issuing CA is not on the 
list, the client will not be authenticated unless the server can verify a certificate chain ending in 
a CA that is on the list (see CA Hierarchies for details). Administrators can control which 
certificates are trusted or not trusted within their organizations by controlling the lists of CA 
certificates maintained by clients and servers.  
4. The server uses the public key from the CA's certificate (which it found in its list of trusted 
CAs in Step 3) to validate the CA's digital signature on the certificate being presented. If the 
information in the certificate has changed since it was signed by the CA or if the public key in 
the CA certificate doesn't correspond to the private key used by the CA to sign the certificate, 
the server won't authenticate the user's identity. If the CA's digital signature can be validated, 
the server treats the user's certificate as a valid "letter of introduction" from that CA and 
proceeds. At this point, the SSL protocol allows the server to consider the client authenticated 
and proceed with the connection as described in Step 6. Netscape servers may optionally be 
configured to take Step 5 before Step 6.  
5. This optional step provides one way for a system administrator to revoke a user's certificate 
even if it passes the tests in all the other steps. The Netscape Certificate Server can 
automatically remove a revoked certificate from the user's entry in the LDAP directory. All 
servers that are set up to perform this step will then refuse to authenticate that certificate or 
establish a connection. If the user's certificate in the directory is identical to the user's 
certificate presented in the SSL handshake, the server goes on to step 6.  
6. The server checks what resources the client is permitted to access according to the server's 
access control lists (ACLs) and establishes a connection with appropriate access. If the server 
doesn't get to step 6 for any reason, the user identified by the certificate cannot be 
authenticated, and the user is not allowed to access any server resources that require 
authentication. . 
 Figure 2.5 Exemplary reports about certificate. 
Certificate of web server 
Certificate: 
    Data: 
        Version: 3 (0x2) 
        Serial Number: 1 (0x1) 
        Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 
        Issuer: O=Seccure, OU=Seccure Root CA 
        Validity 
            Not Before: Nov 28 01:00:20 2004 GMT 
            Not After : Nov 28 01:00:20 2005 GMT 
        Subject: O=Seccure, OU=Seccure Labs, CN=www.seccure.lab 
        Subject Public Key Info: 
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 
            RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) 
                Modulus (1024 bit): 
                    00:c1:19:c7:38:f4:89:91:27:a2:1b:1d:b6:8d:91: 
                    48:63:0e:3d:0d:2e:f8:65:45:56:db:98:4d:11:21: 
                    01:ac:81:8e:3f:64:4a:8a:3f:21:15:ca:49:6e:64: 
                    5c:5d:a2:ab:5a:48:cb:2a:9f:0c:02:b9:ff:52:f6: 
                    d9:39:6d:a3:4a:94:41:f9:e9:ab:f0:42:fb:68:9a: 
                    4b:53:41:e7:4f:b0:2b:02:d7:92:a2:2b:02:a2:f9: 
                    f1:2d:68:fa:50:01:2f:49:c1:28:2f:a8:c6:6d:6d: 
                    ab:1d:b9:bd:c9:80:63:f1:d6:22:19:de:2d:4a:43: 
                    50:76:79:7e:a5:5a:75:af:19 
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) 
        X509v3 extensions: 
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: 
                CA:FALSE 
            Netscape Cert Type: 
                SSL Server 
            X509v3 Key Usage: 
                Digital Signature, Key Encipherment 
            X509v3 Extended Key Usage: 
                TLS Web Server Authentication, Netscape Server Gated Crypto,  
                                                             Microsoft Server Gated Crypto 
            Netscape Comment: 
                OpenSSL Certificate for SSL Web Server 
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 
        45:30:9d:04:0e:b7:86:9e:61:a1:b0:68:2b:44:93:1c:57:2a: 
        99:42:bb:16:b1:ab:f5:c0:d2:33:12:c8:d3:1d:2b:bb:6b:9a: 
        4c:c7:53:bc:e4:88:ef:1e:c3:37:ed:53:2c:15:cf:b8:90:df: 
        df:4b:34:b8:db:cc:23:77:46:06:72:9d:43:60:a8:a2:ed:0a: 
        bb:1a:a4:e8:4e:ba:66:93:63:74:87:fd:43:48:b6:93:a2:e3: 
        3d:da:1b:64:46:35:88:b4:4b:22:e6:3c:84:70:5d:88:dd:64: 
        c2:51:c2:d6:59:80:87:bc:bd:7f:e3:c1:45:7e:c0:5f:9c:ca: 
        e1:a1 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.  
Implementation 
3.1 Implementation 
In this chapter is described the operation over the digital certificates as untangling digital 
certificates, obtaining of certificates, installing the certificates,  the graphics, and the 
designing and implementation of the program with easy structure which allow to do some 
operation over the certificates in Windows operation system.  
Untangling Digital Certificates 
Digital certificates, more commonly just called certificates, are used by the SSL security protocol to 
encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate data. The certificate contains the owner's company name and other 
specific information that allows recipients of the certificate to identify the certificate's owner. The 
certificate also contains a public key used to encrypt the message being transported across the Internet. 
 As I mentioned earlier, SSL uses two kinds of certificates: root certificates and server certificates. 
Root certificates are installed on the browser, and server certificates exist on the Web server. A root 
certificate tells the browser that you will accept certificates signed by the owner of the root certificate. 
For example, if you install a root certificate signed and issued by Blue Sand Software into your 
browser, you will be able to authenticate and decrypt messages that were sent from Blue Sand 
Software. This is vital to ensuring a secure transaction. Server certificate is installed on the Web 
server. It works much like the root certificate and is in charge of encrypting the messages sent to 
browsers and decrypting messages received from browsers. 
 
So how do you get these certificates? You'll need to go to the Web site of one of the various certificate 
authorities and submit a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). After you submit the CSR, the certificate 
authority will verify that your business is valid and issue you a server certificate. You then install the 
server certificate on the Web server. But keep in mind that any user who wants to use your secure Web 
server must have the root certificate from the certificate authority installed on their browser as well. 
Most browsers have a Verisign root certificate preinstalled, so if Verisign is your server certificate 
authority, you're ready to go.  
 
 
 
Breaking Down Encryption 
SSL handles the scrambling of messages for you so that only the intended recipient can read it. The 
encryption/decryption process goes something like this: 
1. The user browses to the secure Web server's site. 
2. The user's SSL secured session is started and a unique public key is created for the browser 
(using the certificate authority's root certificate). 
3. A message is encrypted and then sent from the browser using the server's public key. The 
message is scrambled during the transmission so that nobody who intercepts the message can 
make sense of it. 
4. The message is received by the Web server and is decrypted using the server's private key. 
The process of SSL encryption relies upon two keys: the server's public key and private key. The 
private key only exists on the Web server itself and is used by the Web server to encrypt and decrypt 
secure messages. The public key exists on any client computer that has installed a root certificate for 
that Web server. Once the public key is installed, the user can send encrypted messages to and decrypt 
messages received from the Web server. Figure 1 shows this process. Just to be extra safe, the keys are 
discarded once the transaction's session ends. 
 
 
Figure 1 Asymmetrical Encription using SSL 
 
 
SSL doesn't prevent the message from being intercepted. However, it does make the message useless 
to the rogue interceptor. In other words, someone could capture the message on its way to the secure 
Web server, but could not decrypt it because they do not have the server's private key. 
 The encryption process can be either symmetric or asymmetric. Symmetric encryption uses a single 
key by both parties to encrypt and decrypt secure messages. The problem is that the key itself has to be 
passed along as part of the conversation. This leaves the key, with its power to decrypt the messages, 
easy prey to a seasoned cracker. Because of this downfall, asymmetric encryption was welcomed with 
open arms. Since the keys are never transported with asymmetric encryption, there is never a risk of 
them being stolen by a rogue third party. As you can see in Figure 1, using asymmetric encryption lets 
you tightly and securely transacts business via the Web. 
 With asymmetric encryption, why can't someone with the root certificate steal a secure message and 
decrypt it themselves? Well, each session key (or public key) generated by the root certificate is 
unique. So even if the cracker has the same root certificate installed on their browser, it will do them 
no good in their attempts at decrypting the message. In fact, even the originating browser of the 
encrypted message can't decrypt it. Only the Web server with the appropriate private key can decrypt 
the message.  
 
3.2 Certificate authority 
 
Certificates are signed by the Certificate Authority (CA) that issues them. In essence, a CA is a 
commonly trusted third party that is relied upon to verify the matching of public keys to identity, e-
mail name, or other such information.  
 
The benefits of certificates and CAs occur when two entities both trust the same CA. This allows them 
to learn each other's public key by exchanging certificates signed by that CA. Once they know each 
other's public key, they can use them to encrypt data and send it to one another, or to verify the 
signatures on documents.  
 
A certificate shows that a public key stored in the certificate belongs to the subject of that certificate. A 
CA is responsible for verifying the identity of a requesting entity before issuing a certificate. The CA 
then signs the certificate using its private key, which is used to verify the certificate. A CA's public 
keys are distributed in software packages such as Web browsers and operating systems, or they can 
also be added manually by the user.  
 
Software that is designed to take advantage of the PKI maintains a list of CAs that it trusts. In order to 
create a certificate, you need to create the base on which to tie your modules. This container, further 
referenced to as "Certificate envelope", is issued by a traditional The Certificate envelope is basically 
just like any other module, but since it is required for all other modules to function it was named 
certificate envelope. The required artifacts in each and every certificate envelope are: 
• The certificate id is the artifact that uniquely identifies a certificate envelope and is required to map 
modules to a specific certificate envelope. Separating the identifier from the users public key creates a 
more loosely coupled structure. By doing so, we gain traceability of a certificate, so that a validating 
source easily can identify and contact the certificate / revocation authority. In addition to this, it would 
be technically possible to reassign a certificate’s key pair. Even though this would facilitate recovery 
from revocation, it would further complicate the already delicate problems of revocation distribution 
and checking. 
 
• The public key of the certificate authority that issued the certificate envelope. This is the 
corresponding public key to the key used for signing the certificate envelope in order to ensure the 
integrity of the envelope. 
• In order to tie the certificate to a person, a standard PKI keypair is used. In order for validating 
sources to verify that the party presenting the the certificate is the owner, a challenge is made using 
this public key as the cryptographic key. 
• The certificate envelope is signed with the CA:s private key. The signature is used in conjunction 
with the CA:s public key in order to ensure the integrity of the certificate envelope. 
• The date when the certificate was created. 
• The date the certificate envelope is valid from. 
• The date the certificate envelope is valid to. 
• Optional, alternate way to look up possible certificate revocation. As an example, a 
third-party revocation authority could be suggested here in case the primary authority is unreachable. 
 
PKI sets up entities, called certificate authorities, that implement the PKI policy on certificates. The 
general idea is that a certificate authority is trusted, so that users can delegate the construction, 
issuance, acceptance, and revocation of certificates to the authority, much as one would use a trusted 
bouncer to allow only some people to enter a restricted nightclub. PKI leaves some room for 
interpretation; one of the areas where PKIs differentiates is the handling of certificates, which 
according to me also is the most crucial part. In “Security in Computing” the tasks a certificate 
authority should have are described as:  
• managing public key certificates for their whole life cycle  
• issuing certificates by binding a user’s or system’s identity to a public key with a digital signature  
• scheduling expiration dates for certificates  
• ensuring that certificates are revoked when necessary by publishing certificate revocation lists  
Many PKI have a hierarchical structure for CAs and are built using a centralized architecture. However 
there are alternatives. PKI is categorized by the architecture types as follows: 1. Hierarchical PKI  2. 
Mesh PKI  3. Trust-file PKI  
The difference is the way how they rely on CA (Certification Authority). A hierarchical PKI has the 
most significant CA in terms of trust at the root of the hierarchy tree. A mesh PKI has CAs issue cross-
certificates to each other. A trust-file PKI has a local file of public-key certificates that the user trusts 
as starting points for certification chain  
Unfortunately, we consider the requirement of signature validation less likely to be solved. Adding 
revocation checks for each signature in each module would require enormous amounts of traffic and 
administration. Even if the revocation systems and the validating clients were to withstand the traffic 
and computational power, the problem of signature administration for the users would still be a major 
problem. Every signing entity would have to keep a public record of revoked signatures. In effect, for 
every entity, there would have to be a signature repository. Requiring that every user constantly 
monitors the subject of a signature would not be feasible, and would make the system unusable for a 
major part of the intended users. On the other hand, supporting a signature revocation system that only 
a minority uses would instead lead to a false sense of security. While the trust system of PGP may 
work in small, well-known groups, we believe it would not work in a global identity system. 
 
3.3 The operation over certificates. 
 
This part will describe how action is handled by the different PKI architectures. These changing 
structures and methods will be compared and analyzed.  
 
PKIX  
There are two kinds of revokes in PKIX the first one is an automated one; when the lease time of a 
certificate have past, the certificate is automatically seen as revoked.  
The other revocation case is when some authorized entity has requested a revocation of some 
certificate.  
When revocation has been verified as the new certificate are put in a certificate revocation list, this list 
is later on published on the different repositories.  
 
PGP 
 The weakest link of OpenPGP PKI is the revocation of public key. As there is no official channel for 
acquiring and distributing OpenPGP public keys, there are no guarantee about how to tell everyone 
that your key is no longer valid. The typical answer to this problem of PGP is to use PGP public key-
server for distributing certification. “Typically, to communicate that a certificate has been revoked, a 
signed note, called a key revocation certificate, is posted on PGP certificate servers, and widely 
distributed to people who have the key on their public key-rings. People wishing to communicate with 
the affected user, or use the affected key to authenticate other keys, are warned about the hazards of 
using that public key”. However, there are few research on the PGP public key-server and usually the 
key-server is not considered as the part of OpenPGP PKI  
PGP encryption uses public-key cryptography and includes a system which binds the public keys to a 
user name and/or an e-mail address. The first version of this system was generally known as a web of 
trust to contrast with the X.509 system which uses a hierarchical approach based on certificate 
authority and which was added to PGP implementations later. Current versions of PGP encryption 
include both options through an automated key management server. In the (more recent) OpenPGP 
specification, trust signatures can be used to support creation of certificate authorities. A trust signature 
indicates both that the key belongs to its claimed owner and that the owner of the key is trustworthy to 
sign other keys at one level below their own. A level 0 signature is comparable to a web of trust 
signature since only the validity of the key is certified. A level 1 signature is similar to the trust one 
has in a certificate authority because a key signed to level 1 is able to issue an unlimited number of 
level 0 signatures. A level 2 signature is highly analogous to the trust assumption users must rely on 
whenever they use the default certificate authority list (like those included in web browsers); it allows 
the owner of the key to make other keys certificate authorities. 
 
PGP versions have always included a way to revoke  identity certificates. A lost or compromised 
private key will require this if communication security is to be retained by that user. This is, more or 
less, equivalent to the certificate revocation lists of centralized PKI schemes. Recent PGP versions 
have also supported certificate expiration dates. 
 
The problem of correctly identifying a public key as belonging to a particular user is not unique to 
PGP. All public key / private key cryptosystems have the same problem, if in slightly different guise, 
and no fully satisfactory solution is known. PGP's original scheme, at least, leaves the decision 
whether or not to use its endorsement/vetting system to the user, while most other PKI schemes do not, 
requiring instead that every certificate attested to by a central certificate authority be accepted as 
correct. 
PGP, on the other hand, uses a decentralized certification system called .The Web of Trust.. The 
system is self-certifying, people who already trust each other, sign each others keys. In this way small 
rings of trusted groups build up, and start to join forming a larger web. Someone who is not part of the 
web, or is part of an unconnected subsection of the web, can still communicate with other people, they 
just have to take it on trust that they are who they say they are. This is not a huge risk when you 
consider the concept of identity on the Internet. If you are mailing someone you have never met 
before, in response to a post to a newsgroup for instance, then you do not actually need to know who 
they are; you are only responding to what they have written. On the other hand if you are passing 
confidential data to a counterpart in another company, that you have never met before, then you would 
naturally ring them or meat them in person. Once you actually trust the person, PGP employs a 
fingerprint method (hash of the public key), to check that the certificate you have got is actually that of 
the person you met or rang.  
PGP, on the other hand, uses a decentralized certification system called .The Web of Trust. The system 
is self-certifying, people who already trust each other, sign each others keys. In this way small rings of 
trusted groups build up, and start to join forming a larger web. Someone who is not part of the web, or 
is part of an unconnected subsection of the web, can still communicate with other people, they just 
have to take it on trust that they are who they say they are. This is not a huge risk when you consider 
the concept of identity on the 
Internet. If you are mailing someone you have never met before, in response to a post to a newsgroup 
for instance, then you do not actually need to know who they are; you are only responding to what they 
have written. On the other hand if you are passing confidential data to a counterpart in another 
company, that you have never met before, then you would naturally ring them or meat them in person. 
Once you actually trust the person, PGP employs a fingerprint method (hash of the public key), to 
check that the certificate you have got is actually that of the person you met or rang. 
 
Suggested solution 
 
The X.509 framework defines the CA to distribute CRLs for end entities to use as a revocation 
reference. In the proposed solution, validation is made by the CA it self, this makes revocation faster; 
the revocation requests are validated and carried out, since each validation goes through the CA the 
revocation becomes instant. The suggested solution is based on the X.509 framework. This framework 
has good structure  use centralized certificate authority  
 
First registration  
First registration/certification: This is the process where an end entity first makes itself known to a CA 
or RA, prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates for that end entity. The end result of this 
process (when it is successful) is that a CA issues a certificate for an end entity's public key, and 
returns that certificate to the end entity and/or posts that certificate in a public repository.   
This scheme will follow that of the original scheme in X.509 (a three way handshake), with some 
modifications.  
  
Initial registration scheme 
In “Handle response” (step 8) a task is added at the end entity; to process the information regarding the 
level appointed. If some part of the handshake (step 3, 7 and 10) fails, the certificate authority 
automatically revocation the newly created certificate as in X.509. To add some level of security to 
this scheme,  I propose that the CA puts the created by not yet confirmed certificates in a “to be 
verified” structure, before adding it to the lists of certificates, in this way it doesn’t have to be revoked 
(it have never been verified). These certificates will then upon confirmation be added to the list and the 
validation process. This would be the last step in the, initial registration scheme and followed by 
publication of certificate  
 
Certificate update  
 
Certificate update: As certificates expire they may be "refreshed" if nothing relevant in the 
environment has changed. As the definition above implies this scheme is only used when the 
environment is secure, therefore not used in the higher certificate levels of security. This is an 
important part of the trust issue that the proposed solution build on; don’t even take the risk of getting 
compromised. 
 
 Certificate update scheme 
 
As in Key-pair update a proof of possession, verifies the entity in step 3. After verification the update 
process involves “repackaging”; the old key is reused, but some attributes need to be updated. When 
repackaging is done, a new one-way-hash has to be computed and updated in the validation database 
along with the new lease time and the certificate. In case of failure in any of the three parts of the 
handshake (step 2, 6 and 9), both, new and old, certificates will automatically be annulated.  
 
Certification validation  
 
 
 
To validate a downloaded certificate, the end entity constructs a validation request message (step 1) 
containing (amongst other attributes) a one-way-hashed value of the certificate in question. After 
verifying the requesting entity the one-way-hash value is used for validating the certificate (step 4), if 
the value matches a value in the validation database, it is validated else revoked. The validation 
response (Figure 8; step 6) contains the outcome of the validation. If the verification succeeds, 
communication can be initiated (step 7).  The advantage using this certificate structure, in comparison 
to writing a new structure, is that no changes have to be to the “parsers” of existing architectures. 
Parsing and handling the security levels are as explained earlier an implementation issue.  
3.4 Designing of program. 
In Windows operating system there are no regular techniques for working with certificates and the 
given program allows to work effectively with storehouse of certificates, to look through, add, delete, 
and also to export and to import from storehouse. The storehouse of certificates is used by all programs 
of Windows operating system for example Outlook. To transfer certificates from one computer to 
another it is possible but it difficult and long to do. 
In the screen of program you can see the list of certificates. In this case we can see the properties of 
Web money Transfer Root Certificate, which is stored in storehouse of Window, the certificate size, 
signature algorithm, public key algorithm, version, serial number of certificate, validation of 
certificate. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The very first question a Web server administrator must confront is, "Do I really want/need to provide 
dynamic content from my server?" While dynamic content has allowed for a diverse range of user 
interaction and become a de facto standard for most large Web sites, it remains one of the largest 
security threats on the Internet. CGI applications and SSI-enabled pages are not inherently insecure, 
but poorly written code can potentially open up dangerous back doors and gaping holes on what would 
otherwise be a well-secured system. 
The following are the three most common security risks CGI applications and SSI pages create: 
 
Information leaks: Providing any kind of system information to a hacker could potentially provide a 
hacker with the ammunition they need to break into your server. The less a hacker knows about the 
configuration of a system, the harder it is to break into.  
 
Access to potentially dangerous system commands/applications: One of the most common exploits 
used by hackers is to "take over" a service running on the server and use it for their own purposes. For 
example, gaining access to a mail application via an HTML form-based script, and then harnessing the 
mail server to send out spam or acquire confidential user information.  
Depleting system resources: While not a direct security threat per se, a poorly written CGI application 
can use up a system's available resources to the point where it becomes almost completely 
unresponsive.  
For security purposes administrators are responsible to: keep current with security patches, evaluate 
and expeditiously apply as appropriate; keep the operating system at a level supported by the vendor; 
properly restrict access to information; ensure the administrator of the server, or a designate, will be 
available during working hours to resolve problems; keep and make available a current list of phone 
numbers where administrators or designates may be reached in a critical situation outside normal 
hours. 
The intent was to create a model that improved the way revocation is handled in terms of:   
Revocation time: By constructing a new validation scheme, that puts the certificate authority in charge, 
the trust mechanism is further centralized (less entities involved in decisions). This new scheme 
minimizes the time it takes for all entities to be aware of the revoked certificates, whereas the 
Revocation Time requirement is fulfilled.  
Security:  When using the new schemes, all communicating entities contacts certificate authority and 
requests validation of the entities they which to communicate with. Since revocation time has been 
reduced to nearly non-existing, security regarding revocation has been enhanced, whereas the Security 
requirement has been fulfilled.  
Scalability: Different levels of security have been nested into the original (X.509) certificate and 
structures have been created to ensure that the levels are followed. Different environments could use 
different levels of security, whereas the Scalability requirement has been fulfilled. The requirements 
have been fulfilled with small changes done to the original (X.509) framework. The reuse of existing 
certificate structures and communication protocols is for the better; fewer changes have to be made to 
existing architectures, which makes it doable.  
For servers containing mission critical information we recommend also:  provide high availability; 
provide users with the ability to audit use via logs and monitor exceptions;  provide backup of data  
provide back out procedures for installations of new software or configurations;  upgrade (server and 
application software and hardware) and provide capacity planning;  regularly attend the WWW-Tech 
meetings and provide updates on progress and problems as  well as new software functions available. 
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